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Fig. 1 | BMC Genomics

Fig. 1

From: A secure SNP panel scheme using homomorphically encrypted K-mers without SNP calling on the user side

Fig. 1

The traditional and homomorphic SNP detection scheme. In this figure, \(\mathcal {E}(\cdot)\) and \(\mathcal {D}(\cdot)\) denote encryption and decryption respectively. Encryption needs public key while decryption needs private key. The subscript refers to the owner of the private key. For example, \(\mathcal {E}_{hos} (\cdot)\) means the data is encrypted with hospital’s public key thus only the hospital can decrypt it. a demonstrates traditional way of detecting SNP. The patient gives the hospital the raw sequence. In order to protect data from being stolen in the middle, the sequence is encrypted using the hospital’s public key. The hospital decrypts patient sequence and performs computation to detect SNP. The hospital returns the SNP existence information encrypted with the patient’s public key to the patient. The patient can decrypt and get the SNP information. b on the other hand, demonstrates the same SNP detection scheme in homomorphic way. The patient sends one’s encrypted raw sequence but this time with the public key. Due to its homomorphic property, the hospital can perform computations on the sequence only with the public key, without decrypting the sequence. The result is acquired in encrypted form, and the hospital returns the result to patient not knowing its content. The patient can decrypt the result in secure environment

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